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Contextual Constructions and Clear-Cut Tests: 
The Interpretation of Business Interruption 
Provisions in Insurance Contracts
?
Lee Mason*
The recent Court of Final Appeal decision in New World Harbourview 
Hotel Co Ltd v ACE Insurance Ltd reaffi rms the courts’ approval of the 
contextual approach toward the construction of commercial contracts 
generally, and the importance of clear-cut tests, particularly with 
regard to determining the scope of indemnity coverage in insurance 
contracts.
Facts
This Court of Final Appeal case concerned the construction of an 
insurance policy on which the appellants sought to rely in order to 
recover losses sustained from an interruption to their businesses caused 
by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003. The critical 
provision for construction was cl 14.5 of the insurance policy, which read 
as follows:
“This Policy is extended to insure actual loss sustained by the Insured, 
resulting from a Reduction in Revenue and increase in Cost of Working as 
a result of … infectious or contagious disease … occurring on the Premises of 
the Insured or of a notifi able human infectious or contagious disease occurring 
within 25 miles of the Premises.” (Emphasis added.)
The appellants (who were owners or operators of convention centres, 
hotels, car parks, etc) claimed that their loss was covered by the second 
cause listed in the clause, namely from a “notifi able human infectious 
or contagious disease occurring within 25 miles of the premises”.1 The 
policy’s insurance coverage period was 1 July 2002 to 1 July 2003. 
* LLB (Hons), LLM, MCIArb, Barrister-at-Law, CEDR Accredited Mediator, Assistant Professor 
of Law, University of Hong Kong.
1 It was undisputed that the 25-mile condition would be satisfi ed once such a disease occurred 
anywhere in Hong Kong. 
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The earliest of the losses claimed by the appellants was from 9 March 
2003 which, although falling within the insurance period, occurred 
before 27  March 2003 which was the date on which SARS became a 
“notifi able” disease under the Quarantine and Prevention of Diseases 
Ordinance (Cap 141) (QPDO).2 
Background to the SARS Outbreak 
The following undisputed chronological facts were taken from a report 
entitled “SARS in Hong Kong: From Experience to Action” (the Report) 
released by the Government’s SARS Expert Committee on 2 October 
2003 and were important to the determination of liability under the 
insurance policy:
• 10 February 2003: Hong Kong media reported an outbreak of a 
pneumonia-like disease in Guangdong;
• 11 February: Guangzhou Bureau of Health confi rmed this 
outbreak—World Health Organisation (WHO) announced that 
it had received reports from Chinese authorities of an epidemic 
of acute respiratory syndrome, with 300 cases and fi ve deaths in 
Guangdong—in Hong Kong, the Hospital  Authority convened 
a Working Group to establish a surveillance system for cases of 
atypical pneumonia in public hospitals;
• 12 February: Working Group set out procedures for requesting 
notifi cation by public hospitals to the Department of Health of 
any cases of severe community-acquired pneumonia (CAP);
• 13 February: the same request for notifi cation was made to private 
hospitals;
• 22 February: a Chinese visitor (Patient AA – the most likely 
source of the outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong), after  arriving in 
Hong Kong the previous day, was admitted to  hospital;
• 4 March: Patient AA died;
• 12 March: WHO issued a global alert notice about cases of 
acute respiratory syndrome in Hong Kong, Guangdong and 
Vietnam;
• 15 March: WHO issued an emergency travel advisory statement, 
identifying the disease as “SARS” for the fi rst time;
2 Ie when the Hong Kong Government added SARS to the list of infectious diseases in Sch 1 of 
the QPDO. Note that this ordinance has since been replaced by the Prevention and Control 
of Disease Ordinance (Cap 599).
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• 22 March: scientists discovered the cause of SARS;
• 27 March: Hong Kong Government added SARS to the list 
of infectious diseases under Sch 1 of the QPDO making it 
mandatory for SARS cases to be notifi ed to the Government;
• mid-April: it was confi rmed that Patient AA (who had died on 
4 March 2003) had died of SARS;
• 23 June: SARS epidemic was offi cially declared over.
Issue(s) before the Court
As was acknowledged in the leading judgment given by Sir Anthony 
Mason NPJ,3 the grant of leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was 
seemingly confi ned to one issue,4 that is: on the proper interpretation of 
the insurance policy, and on the facts set out in the Report, on what date 
did SARS become a “notifi able human infectious or contagious disease” 
within the meaning of cl 14.5?
However, the court briefl y dealt with a second issue, that is: what is 
the commencement date of coverage under cl 14.5 with regard to losses 
resulting from SARS? 
The Court’s Findings
The First Issue
On the fi rst issue, the Court of Final Appeal unanimously agreed with 
the fi ndings of both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal 
that “notifi able” in cl 14.5 referred to a legal or mandatory requirement to 
notify.
Reaction to the appellants’ argument
The appellants had argued that such an interpretation of “notifi able” 
was too narrow and should, instead, simply include infectious or 
contagious diseases which were serious enough to warrant notifi cation 
to the authorities, as a matter of prudence, such as the (non-mandatory) 
administrative scheme of requesting notifi cation (introduced on 12 and 
3 At [9].
4 There were fi ve preliminary issues for determination before the Court of First Instance and Court 
of Appeal.
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13 February 2003). The appellants had further argued that, even if such 
a reading is not clear, the interpretation should be contra proferentem. 
However, the Court of Final Appeal identifi ed various problems with 
such a contention.
The fi rst problem would be that, if “notifi able” simply referred to those 
diseases serious enough to warrant notifi cation, when would a disease be 
so serious as to warrant such notifi cation? According to the court, “[t]his 
is a question on which medical minds might be expected to differ”.5 
The second problem with the appellants’ argument, according to the 
court, would be that the administrative scheme of requesting notifi cation 
(introduced on 12 and 13 February 2003) is inconsistent with the notion 
inherent in the appellants’ contention (and in cl 14.5) that a “notifi able” 
disease is a serious disease. According to the court, “[a] serious disease ...
would require notifi cation”.6 The third problem identifi ed by the court is 
the lack of defi nition or description of the class of persons being requested 
(on 12 and 13 Feburary 2003) to notify the Department of Health, other 
than the hospitals. According to the court, “[s]urely such a ... scheme 
would need to extend ... to all medical practitioners and carers”.7 The 
fourth problem is that it was unclear, under the scheme (introduced on 
12 and 13 February 2003), which type of case should be notifi ed: a specifi c 
disease or the more vague concept of pneumonia-like symptoms which 
were characteristic of CAP. According to the court, the description of 
the type of case which was being requested to be reported was “imprecise, 
to say the least”.8
The correct interpretation: a contextual approach
Citing various authorities,9 the Court of Final Appeal fi rmly restated the 
correct approach to the interpretation of all commercial contracts:
“The interpretation which should be adopted in the case of an insurance 
contract, as with other commercial contracts, is that which gives effect to the 
context, not only of the particular provision but of the contract as a whole, 
consistently with the sense and purpose of the provision [ … ]. In arriving 
at the true interpretation, the court will read the words and expressions of 
5 At [32], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ. Related to this point, Reyes J (at fi rst instance) noted 
the potential for a “protracted and expensive examination” if the appellants’ proposed 
interpretation was accepted. See [2010] 2 HKLRD 744, [41].
6 At [33], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, emphasis added.
7 Ibid., emphasis added.
8 Ibid.
9 Canelhas Comercio Importacao e Exportacao Ltda v Wooldridge [2005] 1 All ER (Comm) 43, 
48; Algemeene Bankvereeniging v Langton (1935) 51 L1 L Rep 275, 281;  and Jumbo King Ltd v 
Faithful Properties Ltd (1999) 2 HKCFAR 279, 296.
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the contract as ordinary commercial people would understand them in their 
context …”10
The court then emphasised that, where there is ambiguity, the clause 
would be interpreted contra proferentem, recognising that this principle 
has been said to “strongly” apply in the interpretation of insurance 
contracts.11
Applying the contextual approach to the facts in this case
After surveying the various dictionary defi nitions of the word “notifi able” 
in the context of infectious or contagious diseases, the court acknowledged 
that the leading dictionaries “do not speak with a single voice”12 as to 
whether such notifi cation is a mandatory legal obligation. However, the 
court thought that, since the leading medical dictionaries attribute a legal 
obligation to the word “notifi able” in this context, “commercial people 
would look to the medical understandings and expect and intend their 
words to be understood accordingly”.13 As such, the court concluded 
that the phrase “notifi able human infectious or contagious disease” in 
the insurance policy referred to such a disease which is required by law 
to be notifi ed to the relevant authorities. This interpretation, the court 
believed, is not only consistent with most dictionary defi nitions but also 
“gives effect to the immediate context”.14
The court also accepted other contexts in support of its conclusion. 
First, it was noted that cl 14.5 provided for two causes of loss from 
infectious or contagious diseases: one where any infectious or contagious 
disease occurs “on the Premises”, and one where a notifi able infectious 
or contagious disease occurs “within 25 miles of the Premises”. In light 
of this more stringent requirement where an infectious or contagious 
disease occurred away from the premises, the court thought that it was 
appropriate to give the word “notifi able” a “clear and certain meaning”.15 
10 At [34], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ. Note also that Bokhary PJ ([2]) added similar approval 
to such a contextual analysis, quoting Willes J in Kidston v Empire Marine Insurance Co Ltd 
(1865-66) LR 1 CP 535, 546 that the question of construction is “not as to the extension of 
which [the term to be construed] is capable, but of the sense in which it ought to be understood 
in the particular context with which it is to be reconciled” (emphasis added).
11 At [34], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, citing Re Arbitration Between Etherington and Lancashire 
and Yorkshire Accident Insurance Co [1909] 1 KB 591, 596. However, note that Bokhary PJ ([2]) 
also emphasised that where the meaning is clear, the contra proferentem rule does not apply.
12 At [36], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ.
13 At [38], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ.
14 Ibid.
15 At [39], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ. Indeed, Reyes J (at fi rst instance) thought that the parties 
were more likely to have entered into the insurance contract on the basis that there was a 
“clear-cut test” for determining whether a disease was “notifi able”, “[g]iven the importance of 
certainty to commercial parties”. See [2010] 2 HKLRD 744, [41].
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Secondly, it was noted that it was common knowledge that there exist 
statutory regimes in many jurisdictions which provide for mandatory 
notifi cation of specifi ed infectious or contagious diseases. As such, the 
court thought that the parties “would have been well aware” of this and 
“would have contracted with that knowledge in mind”.16
As such, the court concluded the fi rst issue, stating:
“It cannot be doubted that, against this background, commercial people 
would read the words in question as referring to infectious or contagious 
diseases which are required by law to be notifi ed to a public authority. So read, 
the words in question provide a clear and certain criterion for determining 
whether a disease is ‘notifi able’.”17
Such clarity, and the absence of ambiguity, meant that there was nothing 
to attract the contra proferentem principle as an aid to construction.18
The Second Issue
On the second issue, the Court of Final Appeal agreed with the fi ndings 
of both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal that the 
commencement date of coverage for losses resulting from SARS was 
27 March 2003.
The appellants referred to the absence, in cl 14.5, of any stipulation 
that an insured can only recover loss sustained after SARS became 
“notifi able”. Rather, they argued, the only requirement was that the 
loss resulted from a “notifi able” infectious or contagious disease, which 
SARS eventually became, and therefore any loss caused by SARS before 
it became so “notifi able” could still be indemnifi ed so long as it was 
incurred within the policy’s period of coverage (that is, 1 July 2002 to 
1 July 2003).
However, the court simply pointed out that the appellants’ argument 
fails to appreciate that the cause of the loss must be a “notifi able” 
infectious or contagious disease and that such a disease does not become 
so “notifi able” until it is legally required to be notifi ed which, as already 
found, was the 27 March 2003. Therefore, before that date, any loss 
incurred as a result of SARS was not caused by a “notifi able” disease 
capable of being indemnifi ed under cl 14.5. According to the court: 
16 At [40], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ.
17 Ibid., emphasis added.
18 At [42], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ.
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“Clause 14.5 incorporates a discrete indemnity and requires effect to be given 
to the expression ‘notifi able human infectious or contagious disease’ according 
to its true interpretation.”19
Comment
This recent Court of Final Appeal decision makes clear that provisions in 
insurance contracts, as with all commercial contracts, should be construed 
contextually, with regard to the contract as a whole, consistent with how 
they would be understood by ordinary commercial men. The court cited 
and relied on an English Court of Appeal case20 (also concerning the 
interpretation of an insurance contract) where Mance LJ stated that:
“The proper approach is to interpret the wording of the relevant clause as a 
whole in the context of this policy as a whole. The interpretation should be 
through the eyes of an ordinary commercial man …”21
In the instant case, the court then went on to cite and approve one of its 
own earlier judgments—Jumbo King Ltd v Faithful Properties Ltd22—where 
Lord Hoffmann NPJ stated that:
“The construction of a document is not a game with words. It is an attempt 
to discover what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to 
mean. And this involves having regard, not merely to the individual words 
they have used, but to the agreement as a whole, the factual and legal 
background against which it was concluded and the practical objects which 
it was intended to achieve.”23 
However, in that case, Lord Hoffmann NPJ also stated that it was “the 
overriding objective”, when construing contracts, to give effect to what 
a “reasonable person”24 rather than a “pedantic lawyer” would have 
understood the parties to have intended.25 Whereas, in the instant case, 
19 At [45], per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, emphasis added.
20 Canelhas Comercio Importacao e Exportacao Ltda v Wooldridge.
21 Ibid., 48. Mance LJ went on to justify this proposition by reference to the leading House of Lords 
case of Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 
912 where Lord Hoffmann summarised the general principles of contractual interpretation.
22 (1999) 2 HKCFAR 279.
23 Ibid., 296.
24 Ie one who would be privy to all the background knowledge reasonably available to the parties 
(see Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society, 912), in this context: 
an ordinary commercial man.
25 Jumbo King Ltd v Faithful Properties Ltd, 296.
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Sir Anthony Mason NPJ stated that such an interpretation as understood 
by ordinary commercial men would be preferred “in appropriate cases”26 
to any technical meaning. This then raises the question as to when it 
might not be appropriate for the court to prefer the meaning attributed to 
the words by ordinary commercial men. Although this might be thought 
to undermine certainty, such a qualifi cation may provide a little fl exibility 
for the courts to attribute a different meaning where justice requires, 
such as, for example, where one party is clearly trying to escape from a 
bad bargain. 
Nevertheless, commercial certainty seems to be a recurrent theme 
throughout each level of these proceedings.27 At each stage, the case 
illustrates the emphasis laid by the Hong Kong courts on the need for 
certainty with regard to contractual interpretation. In particular, the 
courts seem to favour clear-cut tests in ascertaining the meaning of 
provisions in insurance policies, so as to avoid protracted litigation 
in determining the scope of coverage. As such, this recent Court of 
Final Appeal decision will no doubt serve as a welcome aid to other 
potential litigants who seek to establish the true scope of similar business 
interruption provisions in Hong Kong insurance policies.
26 At [34].
27 See, for example, Reyes J, [2010] 2 HKLRD 744, [41].
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